Noland on The Accelerating Government Debt Bubble

From my analytical perspective, the heart of the problem lies with this dysfunctional dynamic between global marketable debt and derivatives markets, policy-induced distortions, and unfettered speculative finance. Unique in history, we continue to operate with a global financial “system” functioning without limits to either the quantity or quality of new Credit created. There’s way too much Credit backed by little more than government assurances or perceptions of government insurance. And never before has an enormous global “leveraged speculating community” so dominated the markets for debt instruments and, in the process, so relied on faith in the efficacy of government market interventions. It’s global wildcat banking in its purest ever form.

These days, entities all over the world issue enormous quantities of tradable debt instruments. This debt, in large part, is purchased by sophisticated market operators earning unimaginable compensation for achieving “above market” returns. When market psychology is bullish, there is essentially unlimited demand for marketable debt – a significant portion acquired through the use of leverage. And as long as demand for new marketable securities remains robust, underlying positive fundamentals appear to support a high market valuation for this debt (irrespective of the quantity issued). But Katy bar the door whenever the crowd moves to cut exposure – either through liquidating positions or acquiring market “insurance.”

Eurozone policymakers look foolish these days for not having reined in profligate Greek borrowing and spending. To many, the ECB looks foolish for Sunday’s decision to purchase in the open market debt issued by Greece, Portugal, Spain and other troubled European countries. Others believe the ECB was foolish for not having had initiated a Federal Reserve-style monetization plan before the debt crisis spiraled out of control. I sympathize with the ECB. Dysfunctional global markets placed them in a winless situation. Greek 10-year bond yields were below 5% for much of 2009. The market was happy to accommodate profligacy - until it wasn’t. If only well-functioning global markets disciplined borrowers rather than emboldening them.

The sea change in global finance gained unstoppable momentum in the early nineties. The Greenspan Federal Reserve nurtured marketable debt as a mechanism to help overcome severe banking system impairment. There was no stopping the historic boom in market-based Credit once unleashed. The problem was clear by the time of the 1994 bond and mortgage securities dislocation. But it was politically and monetarily expedient to allow GSE Credit (with its implicit government guarantee) to evolve into a mechanism for stabilizing the Credit system and spurring economic expansion.

The rapidly escalating scope of the problem was illuminated with the collapse of LTCM. Yet, the Greenspan Fed supported this new financial infrastructure with only more powerful words and deeds. Pegging short term interest rates and aggressively intervening to rectify market tumult incited unprecedented leveraged speculation throughout the Credit system. Dr. Bernanke’s 2002 “helicopter money” and “government printing press” speeches sealed the fate of runaway Bubbles in both marketable debt and leveraged speculation.

Especially during the Bubble years 2004 through 2007, massive U.S. current account deficits worked to unleash U.S. Credit Bubble dynamics upon the entire world. The more Bubbles became ingrained in the financial architecture the deeper market perceptions became that policymakers wouldn’t tolerate a bust. Worse yet, policymakers resorted to using the debt markets and the market’s propensity for leveraged speculation as mechanisms for increasingly aggressive monetary reflation.

Global policymakers and Credit markets have been fueling Bubbles and accommodating profligacy for years now. It would have taken a concerted effort by global central bankers to rein things in. The Greenspan/Bernanke Federal Reserve would have had no part of it. Quite the contrary. It was fundamental to Greenspan/Bernanke doctrine to deal with market and economic fragility through the aggressive reflation of system Credit. This doctrine of inflationism was instrumental in nurturing Credit and speculation excesses that worked over time to increasingly distort the pricing of finance, the quantity of Credit created, and the allocation of real and financial resources. The ECB’s big mistake was not to forcefully fight the Fed.

We’re now two years into the greatest expansion of global government debt in the history of mankind. Manic-depressive debt markets have pulled the rug out from under Greece and periphery Europe, but in the process have further accommodated profligate government borrowings here at home. It is frightening to think of how distorted the Treasury market has become - and how things might play out down the road.

My bearish thesis on our markets and economy is based upon the view that the financial fuel for our recovery has been unsound, unstable and unsustainable. This “Monetary Process” is now in jeopardy. The Global Government Finance Bubble, which lunged into its terminal phase of excess with the collapse of the Wall Street/mortgage finance Bubble, has been pierced. Greece’s debt crisis marks a momentous inflection point. And, yes, some government markets – certainly including Treasuries – are benefiting from Greek and periphery European debt woes. Yet key Bubble dynamics percolate under the surface.

I have argued that the Global Government Finance Bubble has been the biggest and most precarious Bubble yet. The incredible scope of global sovereign debt expansion over the past couple years has been rather obvious. Less apparent are related distortions - to the pricing and allocation of finance throughout international markets - based specifically upon the market perception that politicians and central bankers would act aggressively and successfully to forestall future crises. This policy-induced market distortion fostered an incredible bout of risk-taking – especially considering the fundamental backdrop – and a resulting massive flood of finance out to the risk markets. This perception has been blown to smithereens in Europe and has quickly become vulnerable everywhere.

Global markets in sovereign Credit default swap (CDS) protection have flourished on the assumption that policymakers would thwart any debt crisis. In the post-Greek debacle era, writing insurance against a government default is no longer free money. New realities have profoundly changed the risk and reward profiles of operating in this key market - and I’ll assume some profoundly less attractive marketplace liquidity dynamics going forward. And a faltering market for sovereign debt insurance significantly changes the risk profile of owning the underlying sovereign debt. To be sure, changing perceptions in the market for government debt work to corrode market confidence in the capacity of policymakers to stem financial and economic crises generally. This implies a major adjustment in the markets’ perception of risk in various markets, including corporate, municipal and mortgage instruments.

But I’m getting somewhat ahead of myself. Thus far, dislocation in Greek debt has fed powerful contagion effects throughout European debt and CDS. This has forced a major market reassessment of the relative stability of the euro currency, which has unleashed bloody havoc throughout the currency and “carry trade” arena. Currency and “carry trade” tumult has forced market reassessment as to near-term prospects for both the dollar (upward) and global growth (downward). This has caused trading liquidation and de-leveraging havoc in the enormous global “reflation trade” and in risk markets more generally. And there’s nothing like liquidation and forced de-leveraging to really bring out the animal spirits for those seeking to make nice speculative profits from others’ misfortune.

The dollar and Treasuries have benefited. This has supported the bullish view that this is largely a European issue. It has also helped dampen the impact to our markets from changing global perceptions with respect to the capacity of policymakers to stem crises. Here in the U.S., Credit spreads and risk premiums (corporates, MBS, municipals, etc.) have widened some. Yet faith still runs deep that Washington won’t allow a crisis. This confidence must hold for sufficiently loose U.S. finance to continue to support our fragile recovery.

The confluence of global financial crisis and intense financial sector scrutiny here at home will at some point prove confidence in Washington overly optimistic. For now, when it comes to pricing risk and disciplining profligate borrowers, our debt markets remain dysfunctional.